Eshka-43 (eshka_43) wrote,
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Международное право: Законен ли был Крымский референдум?

Оригинал взят у pluto9999 в Международное право: Законен ли был Крымский референдум?
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Эрик Познер: "Крымский референдум по присоединению к России является подковерным, нечестным, абсурдным - и вполне законным."
Eric Posner "Let Crimea Go"
Slate
10 марта 2014
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"При невозможности осуществления народом права на самоопределение внутри государства, последней мерой для его реализации является отделение." (When a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession.)
Верховный суд Канады
20 августа 1998
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81. Из практики Совета Безопасности невозможно вывести общий запрет на односторонние декларации независимости.
84. Общее международное право не содержит применимого запрета на декларации независимости.
СООТВЕТСТВИЕ ОДНОСТОРОННЕГО ПРОВОЗГЛАШЕНИЯ НЕЗАВИСИМОСТИ КОСОВО НОРМАМ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО ПРАВА
Международный суд ООН в Гааге
22 июля 2010
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"Международный суд [ООН] решил, что [одностороннее] провозглашение независимости сепаратистскими группами не противоречит международным законам." (The World Court ruled that declarations of independence made by separatist groups are not contrary to international law.)
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С точки зрения международного права
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(1)
ПРОВЕДЕНИЕ РЕФЕРЕНДУМА В КРЫМУ НЕ БЫЛО НЕЗАКОННО, А ОДНОСТОРОННЕЕ ПРОВОЗГЛАШЕНИЕ НЕЗАВИСИМОСТИ - ДОПУСТИМО.
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(2)
РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ РЕФЕРЕНДУМА, ТЕМ НЕ МЕНЕЕ, МОГУТ БЫТЬ СОЧТЕНЫ НЕЗАКОННЫМИ.
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(3)
КОНСТИТУЦИЯ УКРАИНЫ НЕ ЯВЛЯЕТСЯ ПРЕПЯТСТВИЕМ ДЛЯ САМООПРЕДЕЛЕНИЯ НАРОДА КРЫМА.
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Международный Суд ООН в заключении по вопросу о декларации независимости Косово (22 июля 2010), ссылаясь на международно-правовую практику, сложившуюся в предыдущие периоды, пришел к выводу, что международное право не устанавливает никаких разрешительных, но одновременно также и никаких запретительных правил, касающихся вопросов сецессии или отделения. В этом смысле одностороннее провозглашение независимости не подпадает под международно-правовые нормы, а представляет собой только фактически данное обстоятельство. Как факт оно само по себе не имеет особого значения, потому что из провозглашения независимости не следует, что территориальная единица, в отношении которой принята соответствующая декларация независимости, приобрела, тем самым, характер государства. Это зависит от реальных условий и предпосылок.
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Международное право, таким образом, не запрещает проведение, в одностороннем порядке, референдумов о самоопределении и даже одностороннего провозглашения независимости, поскольку это соответствует зафиксированному ООН праву народов (общности людей, объединенных языком и культурой) на самоопределение. Значимость такого референдума, тем не менее, зависит от степени соблюдения условий его проведения - свободы волеизъявления. Наличие в конституции государства прямого запрета на проведение референдума не является препятствием к его проведению (does not matter whether or not secession is explicitly prohibited under domestic law), а лишь означает, что это государство может игнорировать результаты его проведения, либо начать переговоры с сепаратистами об урегулировании ситуации в той или иной форме - от предоставления куцей культурной автономии до полного признания независимости региона. (Пример - Каталония.) Другие государства вольны признать или не признать результаты референдума - на это и влияют условия его проведения, свободы выражения своего мнения населением региона - any change of the legal status requires a free expression of the will of the people.
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В конце статьи даны некоторые ссылки на постановления судов и статьи западных юристов, в том числе выборка из блога Эрика Познера, авторитетного специалиста в области международного права из Университета Чикаго.
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В частности, оксфордский ученый-юрист Видмар, специалист в области международного права, высказал свое мнение о референдуме в Крыму в журнале European Journal of International Law (в основном оно базируется на заключении Верховного Суда Канады по вопросу о проведении референдума в Квебеке и решении Международного суда по Косово) - проведение референдума не может считаться незаконным, если даже запрещено законодательством соответствующего государства.
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'The most lively and interesting journal in the field of general international law, certainly in Europe, possibly anywhere.'
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Jure Vidmar
March 20, 2014
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This contribution explains that while the referendum itself was not illegal in international law, the shift of territorial sovereignty would be illegal. Moreover, in the legal circumstances underlying the situation in Crimea, even the declaration of independence violated international law. This is not because international law would see territorial integrity of states as an absolute norm, but because the effective situation was created by Russia’s use or threat of force.
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По его мнению, само проведение референдума о самоопределении, даже extra-constitutionally, вопреки Конституции Украины (domestic law), не противоречит международным законам (the referendum itself was not illegal in international law), однако он считает, что не были соблюдены необходимые условия - поскольку имело место use or threat of force.
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Вот его замечания по вопросу одностороннего провозглашения независимости
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Groups seeking independence usually present self-determination as an absolute entitlement. Conversely, states countering secession usually present territorial integrity as an absolute entitlement of states. Neither camp is right. As follows from the General Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law (GA Res 2625), the Quebec case (Supreme Court of Canada) and partly also from the Kosovo Advisory Opinion (ICJ), international law is actually neutral on the question of unilateral secession. This means that unilateral secession is neither prohibited nor an entitlement. Furthermore, for the purposes of international law, it does not matter whether or not secession is explicitly prohibited under domestic law.
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As noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec case, an entity may declare independence extra-constitutionally and yet nevertheless become independent if other states are willing to recognise it. This further confirms that unilateral secession unto itself does not trigger an obligation to withhold recognition. By holding a referendum and declaring independence, such an entity in most circumstances does something that remains legally ineffective, yet not internationally wrongful.
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When are declarations of independence illegal? A declaration of independence may be given effectiveness through foreign military assistance. This is where neutrality of international law ends.
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Об этом же говорится и в решении Международного суда по Косово, который, не отвергая априори одностороннего провозглашения независимости, указывает, что признание незаконным одностороннего провозглашения независимости происходит не из-за нарушения им местных законов, а в случае нарушения свободы волеизъявления.
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"[T]he illegality attached to [some other] declarations of independence … stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)." (The Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para 81).
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То есть, с точки зрения международного права, императивной нормой которая, по мнению Видмара, была нарушена в случае референдума в Крыму является unlawful use of force.
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Именно по причине насильственного характера провозглашения независимости международным сообществом не были признаны независимость занятого Турцией Северного Кипра, Южная Родезия Яна Смита, южно-африканские бантустаны времен апартеида. (А в более далеком историческом периоде, например, марионеточное государство Манчжоу-Го.)
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The territorial illegality in these circumstances was not created by the unilateral character of declarations of independence, i.e. without approval of parent states, but by the fact that these entities intended to become states as a result of illegal use of force.
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Видмар отмечает, что, хотя, в ряде случаев, ООН и принимало резолюции, осуждающие одностороннее провозглашение независимости, но
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these resolutions were generally not legally binding. So, for the most part, the duty of non-recognition did not draw normative force from the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers. The duty of non-recognition rather applied under general international law.
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Таким образом, одностороннее провозглашение независимости не может быть признано лишь в том случае, если при этом были допущены вопиющие нарушения.
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Given the norms involved, the following doctrine applies: where declaration of independence is issued in violation of jus cogens, it is illegal and other states have a duty to withhold recognition.
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Итак, референдум о самоопределении допустим всегда, но его решение не обязательно моментально вступает в силу (there is no pre-determined outcome). Так Верховный суд Канады, не запрещая референдума в Квебеке, в то же время, постановил что его возможные результаты (голосование в пользу независимости Квебека) не будут иметь немедленные последствия, а станут лишь поводом к началу переговоров о статусе Квебека.
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In the Quebec case, the Supreme Court of Canada reasoned that a decision in favour of secession, at best, creates an obligation on both sides to negotiate the future legal status of the territory. The central government does not enter into such negotiations with an obligation to determine the technicalities of secession. Negotiations could also lead to a new internal status of the territory, and a higher level of autonomy and self-government.
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ВЫВОД:
International law is neutral on the question of unilateral secession. But the problem in Crimea is not that secession from Ukraine was unilateral. The problem is that it was achieved by Russia’s use or at least threat of force. International law prohibits any change of legal status of a territory in violation of a peremptory norm. This is what makes declarations of independence illegal.
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The general neutrality of international law means that the people of Crimea, in principle, are not precluded from holding a referendum, and even declaring independence and/or willingness to integrate with Russia. But even if the actual use of force were still contested, Russian activities constitute at least a threat of force, which is likewise prohibited by Article 2(4), UN Charter. This is where the neutrality of international law on declarations of independence is over. In the sense of paragraph 81, Kosovo Advisory Opinion, we are no longer talking about a unilateral declaration of independence but an attempt at secession in violation of jus cogens.
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Foreign states are under obligation to withhold recognition. The obligation does not apply because Ukraine’s constitution would not allow secession or because there is no political approval from Kiev. It applies because Russia created an illegal territorial situation by use or threat of force.
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В тексте заключения Верховного суда Канады относительно легитимности, по канадским и международным законам, одностороннего отделения Квебека от Канады содержится ряд положений и ссылок, которые могут быть использованы в качестве аргументов при рассмотрении вопроса о праве на самоопределение Крыма и областей Юго-Востока Украины - например то, что основанием для одностороннего отделения (внешнего самоопределения) может служить отказ в праве на самоопределение внутри государства - "при невозможности осуществления народом права на самоопределение внутри государства, последней мерой для его реализации является отделение" (when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession). Otherwise, so long as a people has the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within an existing nation state, there is no right to secede unilaterally. Канадский суд счел, что франкоканадцы имеют такую возможность внутри Канады, но как обстоит дело с Украиной?
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Аллен Бьюкенен "Сецессия. Право на отделение, права человека и территориальная целостность государства":
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Сецессия считается легитимной, если можно показать, что государство несправедливо относилось к отделяющимся. Несправедливость, которая оправдывает отделение - это не только нарушение индивидуальных прав. Серьёзными основаниями для отделения могут быть также дискриминационное перераспределение, нарушения так называемых “прав штатов” (законных, конституционно определённых полномочий политических единиц, входящих в государство или федерацию) и особых прав групп меньшинств (например, права на использование своего языка). Содержательное обоснование несправедливости со стороны государства может считаться конституционным основанием для отделения. ... Те группы, чьи претензии удовлетворяют критериям оправданности отделения, и имеют право на отделение.
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Моральное право на отделение [означает], что те, кто обладают им, могут, при определённых условиях, отделиться от своего государства, и никто при этом не должен препятствовать им. Моральные аргументы в пользу сецессии могут быть настолько сильными, что препятствовать ей становится морально недопустимым. И это утверждение, как и вообще всякие утверждения о моральном праве, не означает, что есть какая-то таинственная “духовная” сущность, какое-то мистическое “право отделиться”. Нет, это всего лишь краткое выражение довольно длинных, но вполне “земных” и ничуть не “мистических” рассуждений, приводящих к выводу, что есть достаточные моральные основания не препятствовать (при определённых условиях) отделению от государства, даже если не допускать отделения было бы в каких-то отношениях выгодно. Это означает также, что соображения, по которым нельзя препятствовать сецессии, могут оказаться сильнее всех прочих обычно убедительных доводов, которые в иных случаях представляются достаточными основаниями для вмешательства, например, апелляции к наибольшему благу для всех.
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1. Отказ государства положить конец серьёзным несправедливостям, которые оно причиняет отделяющейся группе, может служить оправданием как революции, так и отделению. Однако, поскольку отделение означает, что государство лишается определённой территории со всеми её ресурсами и вообще всем, что на ней находится, оправданность сецессии зависит от того, компенсируют ли сепаратисты не повинных в причинении несправедливостей третьих лиц за ущерб, который те могут понести в результате отделения.
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2. В число несправедливостей, которые может совершать государство, и которые служат оправданием отделения, мы должны включить не только нарушение основных гражданских и политических прав человека, которые ортодоксальная либеральная теория рассматривает как законные основания революции, но и несправедливость дискриминационного перераспределения, государственной эксплуатации одной группы в пользу другой.
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3. В строго определённых и экстремальных ситуациях оправданием сецессии могут быть не только несправедливости, совершаемые государством, но и другие причины. В их число могут входить необходимость сохранения культуры группы и необходимость защиты группы от угрозы буквального уничтожения со стороны агрессоров, от которых не может защитить государство, в которое входит эта группа.
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Supreme Court of Canada
Date: 1998-08-20
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The Court in this Reference is required to consider whether Quebec has a right to unilateral secession.
The Court was also required to consider whether a right to unilateral secession exists under international law.
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A clear majority vote in Quebec on a clear question in favour of secession would confer democratic legitimacy on the secession initiative which all of the other participants in Confederation would have to recognize.
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Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession, the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession is not ruled out. The ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition.
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(1)  Secession at International Law
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It is clear that international law does not specifically grant component parts of sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their "parent" state. Given the lack of specific authorization for unilateral secession, proponents of the existence of such a right at  international law are therefore left to attempt to found their argument (i) on the proposition that unilateral secession is not specifically prohibited and that what is not specifically prohibited is inferentially permitted; or (ii) on the implied duty of states to recognize the legitimacy of secession brought about by the exercise of the well-established international law right of "a people" to self-determination.
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(a)  Absence of a Specific Prohibition
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International law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit denial of such a right, although such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the exceptional circumstances required for secession to be permitted under the right of a people to self-determination, e.g., the right of secession that arises in the exceptional situation of an oppressed or colonial people. International law places great importance on the territorial integrity of nation states and, by and large, leaves the creation of a new state to be determined by the domestic law of the existing state of which the seceding entity presently forms a part.  Where, as here, unilateral secession would be incompatible with the domestic Constitution, international law is likely to accept that conclusion subject to the right of peoples to self-determination.
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(b)  The Right of a People to Self-determination
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While international law generally regulates the conduct of nation states, it does, in some specific circumstances, also recognize the "rights" of entities other than nation states - such as the right of a people to self-determination.
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The existence of the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond "convention" and is considered a general principle of international law.
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Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7, states in part that one of the purposes of the United Nations (U.N.) is:
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            Article 1
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                 . . .
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2.  To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
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Article 55 of the U.N. Charter further states that the U.N. shall promote goals such as higher standards of living, full employment and human rights "[w]ith a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples".
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This basic principle of self-determination has been carried forward and addressed in so many U.N. conventions and resolutions.
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Article 1 of both the U.N.'s  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and its International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, states:
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1.  All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
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Similarly, the U.N. General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970 (Declaration on Friendly Relations), states:
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By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
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In 1993, the U.N. World Conference on Human Rights adopted the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/CONF.157/24, 25 June 1993, that reaffirmed Article 1 of the two above-mentioned covenants. The U.N. General Assembly's Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, GA Res. 50/6, 9 November 1995, also emphasizes the right to self-determination by providing that the U.N.'s member states will:
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Continue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and recognize the right of peoples to take legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their inalienable right of self-determination. This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind. . . .
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The right to self-determination is also recognized in other international legal documents. For example, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) (Helsinki Final Act), states (in Part VIII):
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The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
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By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.
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As will be seen, international law expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states. Where this is not possible, in the exceptional circumstances discussed below, a right of secession may arise.
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(i)  Defining "Peoples"
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International law grants the right to self-determination to "peoples".  Accordingly, access to the right requires the threshold step of characterizing as a people the group seeking self-determination. However, as the right to self-determination has developed by virtue of a combination of international agreements and conventions, coupled with state practice, with little formal elaboration of the definition of "peoples", the result has been that the precise meaning of the term "people" remains somewhat uncertain.
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It is clear that "a people" may include only a portion of the population of an existing state. The right to self-determination has developed largely as a human right, and is generally used in documents that simultaneously contain references to "nation" and "state". The juxtaposition of these terms is indicative that the reference to "people" does not necessarily mean the entirety of a state's population. To restrict the definition of the term to the population of existing states would render the granting of a right to self-determination largely duplicative, given the parallel emphasis within the majority of the source documents on the need to protect the territorial integrity of existing states, and would frustrate its remedial purpose.
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(ii)  Scope of the Right to Self-determination
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The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations as
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[t]he establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
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127
The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.
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128
The Declaration on Friendly Relations, the Vienna Declaration and the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations are specific. They state, immediately after affirming a people's right to determine political, economic, social and cultural issues, that such rights are not to
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be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction. . . .
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129
Similarly, while the concluding document of the Vienna Meeting in 1989 of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe  on the follow-up to the Helsinki Final Act again refers to peoples having the right to determine "their internal and external political status", that statement is immediately followed by express recognition that the participating states will at all times act, as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, "in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States". Principle 5 of the concluding document states that the participating states (including Canada):
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. . . confirm their commitment strictly and effectively to observe the principle of the territorial integrity of States.  They will refrain from any violation of this principle and thus from any action aimed by direct or indirect means, in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other obligations under international law or the provisions of the [Helsinki] Final Act, at  violating the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of a State.  No actions or situations in contravention of this principle will be recognized as legal by the participating States.
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Accordingly, the reference in the Helsinki Final Act to a people determining its external political status is interpreted to mean the expression of a people's external political status through the government of the existing state, save in the exceptional circumstances discussed below. Given the history and textual structure of this document, its reference to external self-determination simply means that "no territorial or other change can be brought about by the central authorities of a State that is contrary to the will of the whole people of that State".
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130
While the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights do not specifically refer to the protection of territorial integrity, they both define the ambit of the right to self-determination in terms that are normally attainable within the framework of an existing state. There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of the territorial integrity of existing states, including Canada, and the right of a "people" to achieve a full measure of self-determination. A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the protection under international law of its territorial integrity.
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(iii)  Colonial and Oppressed Peoples
131
Accordingly, the general state of international law with respect to the right to self-determination is that the right operates within the overriding protection granted to the territorial integrity of "parent" states. However, there are certain defined contexts within which the right to the self-determination of  peoples does allow that right to be exercised "externally", which, in the context of this Reference, would potentially mean secession:
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. . . the right to external self-determination, which entails the possibility of choosing (or restoring) independence, has only been bestowed upon two classes of peoples (those under colonial rule or foreign occupation), based upon the assumption that both classes make up entities that are inherently distinct from the colonialist Power and the occupant Power and that their 'territorial integrity', all but destroyed by the colonialist or occupying Power, should be fully restored. . . .
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132
The right of colonial peoples to exercise their right to self-determination by breaking away from the "imperial" power is now undisputed, but is irrelevant to this Reference.
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133
The other clear case where a right to external self-determination accrues is where a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a colonial context. This recognition finds its roots in the Declaration on Friendly Relations:
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Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accord­ance with the provisions of the Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the implementation of the principle, in order:
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(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States; and
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(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;
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and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the Charter.
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134
A number of commentators have further asserted that the right to self-determination may ground a right to unilateral secession in a third circumstance. Although this third circumstance has been described in several ways, the underlying proposition is that, when a people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession. The Vienna Declaration requirement that governments represent "the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind" adds credence to the assertion that such a complete blockage may potentially give rise to a right of secession.
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135
Clearly, such a circumstance parallels the other two recognized situations in that the ability of a people to exercise its right to self-determination internally is somehow being totally frustrated. While it remains unclear whether this third proposition actually reflects an established international law standard, it is unnecessary for present purposes to make that determination. Even assuming that the third circumstance is sufficient to create a right to unilateral secession under international law, the current Quebec context cannot be said to approach such a threshold.
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136
The population of Quebec cannot plausibly be said to be denied access to government. Quebecers occupy prominent positions within the government of Canada. Residents of the province freely make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development within Quebec, across Canada, and throughout the world. The population of Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions. In short, to reflect the phraseology of  the international documents that address the right to self-determination of peoples, Canada is a "sovereign and independent state conducting itself in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction".
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137
The continuing failure to reach agreement on amendments to the Constitution, while a matter of concern, does not amount to a denial of self-determination.  In the absence of amendments to the Canadian Constitution, we must look at the constitutional arrangements presently in effect, and we cannot conclude under current circumstances that those arrangements place Quebecers in a disadvantaged position within the scope of the international law rule.
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138
In summary, the international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development. In all three situations, the people in question are entitled to a right to external self-determination because they have been denied the ability to exert internally their right to self-determination. Such exceptional circumstances are manifestly inapplicable to Quebec under existing conditions. Accordingly, neither the population of the province of Quebec, even if characterized in terms of "people" or "peoples",  nor its representative institutions, the National Assembly, the legislature or government of Quebec, possess a right, under international law, to secede unilaterally from Canada.
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139
We would not wish to leave this aspect of our answer to Question 2 without acknowledging the importance of the submissions made to us respecting the rights and concerns of aboriginal peoples in the event of a unilateral secession, as well as the appropriate means of defining the boundaries of a seceding Quebec with particular regard to the northern lands occupied largely by aboriginal peoples. However, the concern of aboriginal peoples is precipitated by the asserted right of Quebec to unilateral secession. In light of our finding that there is no such right applicable to the population of Quebec, either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law, but that on the contrary a clear democratic expression of support for secession would lead under the Constitution to negotiations in which aboriginal interests would be taken into account, it becomes unnecessary to explore further the concerns of the aboriginal peoples in this Reference.
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(2)  Recognition of a Factual/Political Reality:  the "Effectivity" Principle
140
As stated, an argument advanced on this branch of the Reference was that, while international law may not ground a positive right to unilateral secession in the context of Quebec, international law equally does not prohibit secession and, in fact, international recognition would be conferred on such a political reality if it emerged, for example, via effective control of the territory of what is now the province of Quebec.
.
141
It is true that international law may well, depending on the circumstances, adapt to recognize a political and/or factual reality, regardless of the legality of the steps leading to its creation.
.
142
No one doubts that legal consequences may flow from political facts, and that "sovereignty is a political fact for which no purely legal authority can be constituted . . .",  H. W. R. Wade, "The Basis of Legal Sovereignty", [1955] Camb. L.J. 172, at p. 196.  Secession of a province from Canada, if successful in the streets, might well lead to the creation of a new state. Although recognition by other states is not, at least as a matter of theory, necessary to achieve statehood, the viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, as a practical matter, upon recognition by other states. That process of recognition is guided by legal norms. However, international recognition is not alone constitutive of statehood and, critically, does not relate back to the date of secession to serve retroactively as a source of a "legal" right to secede in the first place.  Recognition occurs only after a territorial unit has been successful, as a political fact, in achieving secession.
.
143
One of the legal norms which may be recognized by states in granting or withholding recognition of emergent states is the legitimacy of the process by which the de facto secession is, or was, being pursued. The process of recognition, once considered to be an exercise of pure sovereign discretion, has come to be associated with legal norms.  See, e.g.,  European Community Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 31 I.L.M. 1486 (1992), at p. 1487. While national interest and perceived political advantage to the recognizing state obviously play an important role, foreign  states may also take into account their view as to the existence of a right to self-determination on the part of the population of the putative state, and a counterpart domestic evaluation, namely, an examination of the legality of the secession according to the law of the state from which the territorial unit purports to have seceded. An emergent state that has disregarded legitimate obligations arising out of its previous situation can potentially expect to be hindered by that disregard in achieving international recognition, at least with respect to the timing of that recognition. On the other hand, compliance by the seceding province with such legitimate obligations would weigh in favour of international recognition. The notion that what is not explicitly prohibited is implicitly permitted has little relevance where (as here) international law refers the legality of secession to the domestic law of the seceding state and the law of that state holds unilateral secession to be unconstitutional.
.
144
As a court of law, we are ultimately concerned only with legal claims.  If the principle of "effectivity" is no more than that "successful revolution begets its own legality" (S. A. de Smith, "Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations" (1968), 7 West. Ont. L. Rev. 93, at p. 96), it necessarily means that legality follows and does not precede the successful revolution. Ex hypothesi, the successful revolution took place outside the constitutional framework of the predecessor state, otherwise it would not be characterized as "a revolution". It may be that a unilateral secession by Quebec would eventually be accorded legal status by Canada and other states, and thus give rise to legal consequences; but this does not support the more radical contention that subsequent recognition of a state of affairs brought about by a unilateral declaration of independence could be taken to mean that secession was achieved under colour of a legal right.
.
...
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IV.  Summary of Conclusions
151
Quebec could not, despite a clear referendum result, purport to invoke a right of self-determination to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties to the federation. The democratic vote, by however strong a majority, would have no legal effect on its own and could not push aside the principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole. Democratic rights under the Constitution cannot be divorced from constitutional obligations. Nor, however, can the reverse proposition be accepted. The continued existence and operation of the Canadian constitutional order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada. The other provinces and the federal government would have no basis to deny the right of the government of Quebec to pursue secession, should a clear majority of the people of Quebec choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects the rights of others. The negotiations that followed such a vote would address the potential act of secession as well as its possible terms should in fact secession proceed. There would be no conclusions predetermined by law on any issue. Negotiations would need to address the interests of the other provinces, the federal government, Quebec and indeed the rights of all Canadians both within and outside Quebec, and specifically the rights of minorities. No one suggests that it would be an easy set of negotiations.
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152
The negotiation process would require the reconciliation of various rights and obligations by negotiation between two legitimate majorities, namely, the majority of the population of Quebec, and that of Canada as a whole. A political majority at either level that does not act in accordance with the underlying constitutional principles we have mentioned puts at risk the legitimacy of its exercise of its rights, and the ultimate acceptance of the result by the international community.
.
153
The task of the Court has been to clarify the legal framework within which political decisions are to be taken "under the Constitution", not to usurp the prerogatives of the political forces that operate within that framework. The obligations we have identified are binding obligations under the Constitution of Canada. However, it will be for the political actors to determine what constitutes "a clear majority on a clear question" in the circumstances under which a future referendum vote may be taken. Equally, in the event of demonstrated majority support for Quebec secession, the content and process of the negotiations will be for the political actors to settle. The reconciliation of the various legitimate constitutional interests is necessarily committed to the political rather than the judicial realm precisely because that reconciliation can only be achieved through the give and take of political negotiations. To the extent issues addressed in the course of negotiation are political, the courts, appreciating their proper role in the constitutional scheme, would have no supervisory role.
.
154
We have also considered whether a positive legal entitlement to secession exists under international law in the factual circumstances. Some of those who supported an affirmative answer to this question did so on the basis of the recognized right to self-determination that belongs to all "peoples".  Although much of the Quebec population certainly shares many of the characteristics of a people, it is not necessary to decide the "people" issue because, whatever may be the correct determination of this issue in the context of Quebec, a right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of peoples at international law where "a people" is governed as part of a colonial empire; where "a people" is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly where "a people" is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination within the state of which it forms a part. In other circumstances, peoples are expected to achieve self-determination within the framework of their existing state.  A state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under international law and to have that territorial integrity recognized by other states. Quebec does not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that Quebecers have been denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social development. In the circumstances, the National Assembly, the legislature or the government of Quebec do not enjoy a right at international law to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally.
.
155
Although there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession, that is secession without negotiation on the basis just discussed, this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession. The ultimate success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold recognition. Such recognition, even if granted, would not, however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law.
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Заключение Верховного суда Канады по вопросу о референдуме в Квебеке, 20 августа 1998
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Заключение Международного суда ООН по вопросу о независимости Косово, 22 июля 2010
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Международное право: Законен ли был Крымский референдум? - 2
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Международное право: Референдум 11 мая на Юго-Востоке
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Референдум 11 мая на Юго-Востоке: На Западе засуетились
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Сомалиленд ожидает признания
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